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Abstract
Does natural resource abundance decrease Latin American Foreign Direct Investment? This paper studies
the effects of natural resource abundance on foreign direct investment (FDI), by focusing on inequality as
the channel that links these two variables. Two arguments in the literature inspire this paper: 1) scholars
attribute Latin America’s high income inequality to its abundance of natural resources; and 2) some
scholars argue that income inequality leads to lower investment. I argue that large shares of capitalintensive endowments (export measured as percentage share of GDP) are associated with low levels of
secondary and tertiary FDI. The theory is based on the Stopel-Samuelson model, which claims that rises
in the price of a capital-intensive commodity leads to an increase in the return to capital, and conversely,
to a fall in the return to labor and wages. I analyze this logic through a two-stage least square model
examining 15 Latin American countries from 1984-2007. I conclude, among several conflicting results
that the inequality levels generated by exports can explain 40 percent of the variance of secondary and
tertiary FDI.
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Does natural resource abundance decrease Latin American Foreign Direct Investment? This paper studies the effects of natural
resource abundance on foreign direct investment (FDI), by focusing on inequality as the channel that links these two variables.
Two arguments in the literature inspire this paper: 1) scholars attribute Latin America’s high income inequality to its abundance
of natural resources; and 2) some scholars argue that income inequality leads to lower investment. I argue that large shares of
capital-intensive endowments (export measured as percentage share of GDP) are associated with low levels of secondary and
tertiary FDI. The theory is based on the Stopel-Samuelson model, which claims that rises in the price of a capital-intensive
commodity leads to an increase in the return to capital, and conversely, to a fall in the return to labor and wages. I analyze this
logic through a two-stage least square model examining 15 Latin American countries from 1984-2007. I conclude, among several
conflicting results that the inequality levels generated by exports can explain 40 percent of the variance of secondary and tertiary
FDI.
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Natural Resource abundance and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America
Does natural resource abundance decrease foreign direct investment?
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a crucial ingredient of the global economy. In Latin
America, FDI is a major source of economic growth, employment, technology, and productivity.
Because of these benefits, attracting FDI in the region has become a key element of strategies
promoting economic development. However, attracting FDI requires governments in these
countries to provide hospitable climates for foreign investors. A friendly environment for
multinational corporations entails a set of macroeconomic factors such as welcoming exchange
rates, inflation rates, tax rates and a degree of economic openness (Jensen 2003, 587-588).
Qualitative or institutional factors favorable to FDI are the legal system, a politically stable host
country, with high levels of human capital, measured by school enrollment (Walsh and Yu 2010,
4-7). Latin America faces great challenges in maintaining a friendly environment from both
macroeconomic and institutional perspectives. The income inequality of the region, the highest
in the world, remains one of its major defining characteristics. Scholars have pointed to the
region’s natural resource endowments as an explanation for the levels of inequality, also known
as the “resource curse” (Sachs and Warner 1995, 4). In other words, countries gaining an
important part of their revenues from natural resources tend to have a lower economic growth
and suffer from higher poverty rates. This paper studies the effects of natural resource abundance
on foreign direct investment (FDI), by focusing on inequality as the channel that links these two
variables.
Scholars have dedicated large amount of research to the puzzle of Latin America’s poor
economic performance. Among the literature, two arguments inspire this paper: 1) explanations
2
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attribute the region’s high income inequality, to its abundance of natural resources (Leamer et al.
1999, 40); and 2) income inequality leads to lower investment (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 12251226). Leamer et. al (1999) explore the idea that countries with permanent agriculture and
mineral extraction absorb a natural-resource-rich country’s scarce savings, delaying the
emergence of manufacturing. Nevertheless, they argue that if manufacturing does emerge it
concentrates on moderate- to high-capital-intensive products. On the one hand, this path benefits
these countries because it allows them to avoid competing with China and India, countries that
are labor-abundant. On the other hand, resource-rich countries must pay the cost of a higher
income inequality associated with the production of permanent crops and ores, and the delay in
greater income equality caused by manufacturing and the accumulation of human capital that it
requires to be sustained (Gelb 2010, 4-5).
For the purpose of the argument suppose that A = natural resource abundance, B =
inequality, and C = FDI. Considering that scholars claim that A leads to B and that B leads to C,
to what extent can we claim that A leads to C, through the path of B? This, of course, is an
assumption grounded on the assertion that because it is assumed that natural resources
abundance increases inequality, and because it is also assumed that inequality reduces
investment, then natural resources will have a negative impact on such investments. Let us first
examine the logical path from A to C, through B.

3
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Literature Review and Theory
Natural resource abundance and inequality
A leads to B
Raúl Prebish (1949) put forth the argument that the abundance of natural endowments
has an impoverishing effect on Latin American resource-rich countries. First, natural resource
abundant countries face declining terms of trade: as developed nations accumulate wealth, its
demands for raw materials declines relative to its demand for manufactures and services. Second,
efforts to revert this cycle may aggravate it: in order to buy machinery and technology to begin
producing manufactures, resource-rich countries have to further advance their export sales,
decreasing their own price (Prebish 1949; Fishlow et al. 1978). This effect of natural resources
has been exacerbated in Latin America countries where land ownership is highly concentrated,
perpetuating inequality. Third, scholars link natural resources with income inequality based on
the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson mapping of product prices into factor rewards. The model
states that a rise in the relative price of a good will lead to a rise in the return to that factor which
is used most intensively in the production of the good, and conversely, to a fall in the return to
the other factor (Leamer et al.1999, 4-5). For example, in a scenario of high manufacture prices,
Asian countries producing labor-intensive manufactures will experience a rise in the return to
labor, and a fall in the return to capital. However, in Latin America, countries producing capitalintensive products like raw materials will experience a rise in the return to capital and a fall in
the return to labor, meaning a decrease in workers’ wages. Therefore, people in countries with an
export product mix dominated by capital-intensive industries will have lesser access to the fruits
of rising prices of these industries. In summary, factor rewards –i.e. workers’ wages- depend
4
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upon export product mix which depends upon endowments. As a result we can observe how
some endowments attract sectors that promote equality, like in the case of Asian countries, and
others, like in Latin America, do not (Leamer et al. 1999).
Finally, it is worth mentioning the impact of natural endowments on the evolution of
political institutions in Latin America because it shows us another way in which the abundance
of natural resources impact inequality. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that the abundance
of tropical cropland in colonial Latin America created unequal and concentrated land ownership
because the economies of scale of permanent crops –i.e. sugar, coffee- stimulated the acquisition
of greater pieces of land. Furthermore, in Latin America, Spain tended to award very large pieces
of land to worthy recipients, along with titles that fostered feudalism and politics of
institutionalized exclusion (Leamer et al. 1999, 6). Spilimbergo et al. (1999) shows us how landintensive countries have a less equal income distribution while skill intensive countries have a
more equal income distribution, even when controlling for trade openness.
Inequality and investment
B leads to C
Foreign investment is very important to Latin America since it has been one of the major
sources of external financing in the last few years and has also helped modernize the region’s
economic structure (García-Herrero and Santabárbara 2007, 3). There exists a widespread belief
that FDI is the capital inflow that provides one of the greatest contributions to long-term growth
and development (IMF, World Economic Outlook 2007). FDI lands in the host country with a
variety of positive externalities: foreign technology and management skills that are adapted by
the recipient country, and are translated into other sectors. Thus, attracting FDI is among the top
5
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priorities of economic development. Favorable factors that make companies service foreign
markets through affiliate production are: 1) access to resources and markets; 2) efficiency gains
through synergies; and 3) acquisition of strategic assets (Walsh and Yu 2010, 4). In order for a
company to be able to successfully attain the promises of those factors, there needs to be a
welcoming and relatively stable economic and political environment, coupled with high levels of
human capital to provide the labor force that FDI requires. However, in the context of unequal
societies, like that of Latin America the job of setting a welcoming stage for FDI is harder to
achieve. Alessina and Perotti (1996) claim that it is inequality what mainly generates the social
discontent that sparks political instability and detracts foreign companies from investing. Their
literature offers a model to measure the impact of inequality on investment through political
instability, by regressing investment on an index of political stability, GDP, and school
enrollment, on a sample of 71 countries. The authors find that political instability is negatively
correlated to levels of investment, with no specification on whether this investment is foreign or
domestic (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 1223-4).
Having discussed the impact of natural resource abundance on the levels of income
distribution, and that of inequality on investment and considering that these models do not
specify on the type of foreign investment, it is necessary to analyze the extent of such claims for
FDI. Two questions remain to be answered: is natural resource abundance negatively correlated
to levels of FDI? And is inequality the appropriate link to establish such negative relationship
between natural resource and FDI? In other words, could we really claim that because natural
resources increase inequality and because inequality decreases investment, then natural resources
decrease investment? And if so, assuming that resource abundance fuels inequality, does it affect
primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI in the same way?
6
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Natural resource abundance and FDI
A leads to C
The literature has looked at several macroeconomic variables to explain the different
levels of FDI throughout time. Authors have focused on the market size and growth potential due
to the lower costs resulting from economies of scale. Evidence has been provided that larger
populations and transition economies with larger economies attract more FDI (Resmini 2000;
Bevan and Estrin 2000). Also, a decrease in openness has been found to enhance horizontal FDI
as firms evade trade barriers by building production sites in other countries (Walsh and Yu 2010,
5). In a more obvious way, an increase in openness might be associated with an increase in FDI
as the number of opportunities for investment increases (Resmini, 2000). In a similar way,
weaker exchange rates in the recipient country increase FDI as the price of assets decrease (Froot
and Stein 1991; Bloningen 1997). The very same large presence of international business leads
to even higher levels of FDI, either because companies share projects, or because the mere
presence of FDI signals to the community that the business environment is favorable. Businesses
may value other companies’ experience as a way of reducing costs by avoiding previous
contextual mistakes.
Recent findings have highlighted the constraints faced by foreign firms in their activity
due to a lack of physical infrastructure, and skilled workers compared to firms supplying the
domestic market (Kinda 2009). This would give us reasons to suggest that secondary and tertiary
FDI are positively correlated with secondary and tertiary school enrollment. These types of FDI
require higher levels of education than primary FDI since their supply consists of manufacturing
and services, associated with a larger presence of skilled workers in their production functions.
However, Walsh and Yu (2010) show that education, measured in school enrollment have little
7
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effects on FDI. Their results highlight the negative relationship between secondary and tertiary
school enrollment and levels of tertiary FDI. The reason they provide for this counterintuitive
correlation is that current levels of enrollment do not reflect the level of skills attainment in the
economy, and that tertiary education is too broad of a criterion, not reflecting the level of specific
skills that workers need to encourage more FDI in services.
Furthermore, the literature has pointed to other factors affecting FDI in the region, for
example, the nature of China’s inward FDI. Authors have found that Chinese inward FDI have
had a significant negative impact on FDI in Mexico, Colombia and Central America, because of
the export oriented nature of their FDI inflows, which compete in the same export markets. They
have also found that if FDI is oriented towards China’s domestic demand, such as the case of
exporters of commodities, then China’s FDI inflows might be positive for those countries that
have natural resources (García-Herrero and Santabárbara 2007).
Hypotheses
First, the logic of the first hypothesis follows the Stopel-Samuelson model: a rise in the
relative price of a good will lead to a rise in the return to that factor which is used most
intensively in the production of the good, and conversely, to a fall in the return to the other
factor. I expect large shares of capital-intensive endowments (export measured as percentage
share of GDP) to be associated with low levels of secondary and tertiary FDI, because the little
access of the general population to the fruits of the capital puts downward pressure on workers’
wages. This pressure not only increases inequality but also limits the workers’ opportunities of
investing in their education. The less educated a society is, the fewer the supply of skilled labor
needed for manufactures and services. Furthermore, a population that has less participation in the
large industries of the economy might observe difficulties in counting with the levels of income
8

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/21

8

Romero Mascarell: Latin America's resource curse and FDI.

needed for capturing the opportunities that could improve their status. Widespread unequal
opportunities in education will first reduce the number of high-skilled workers, increasing the
wages of these and widening the gap between low and high-skilled workers. Unequal
redistribution of income will result in a more dissatisfied society, fueling social unrest and
leading to more unstable political environments. Countries with such characteristics of internal
conflict and unsteady politics could in turn detract big companies from investing. If economies
do not count with a diversified net export product mix, and only hold large shares of capitalintensive industries, the resulting inequality will lead to higher levels of social discontent. Such
discontent will be translated into a higher demand for fiscal redistribution, financed by
distortionary taxation, thus lowering the rate of growth. High levels of inequality, coupled with
low levels of growth due to distortionary taxation would lead to a less stable government and
more divided government (Josten and Truger 2003, 5). As contending forces from the opposition
might try to profit from the discontent of the people, the strength of government in the legislature
and popular support might decrease. This will threaten the governability of the incumbent. In the
context of poor institutions of enforcement of order, discontent might turn into riots and strikes
that will make the country be perceived as unstable by foreign investors, lowering total FDI.
Therefore:
H1: large shares of capital-intensive endowments (measured as % export share of GDP) are
associated with low levels of FDI.
Second, I argue that larger shares of natural resources serving labor-intensive industries
will increase the levels of secondary and tertiary FDI, because these industries will allow for a
larger redistribution of capital among workers, compared to capital-intensive ones. Increases in
the relative prices of labor-intensive industries will in turn increase the return to labor, which will
9
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be translated in higher wages for workers. This permits the population to invest in education and
increase human capital accumulation, setting a more appropriate labor environment for
companies investing in manufacture and services, also known as secondary and tertiary FDI.
The more prevalent labor-intensive industries are in the export product mix of a country,
the more equality they will generate because the amount of people that these industries will
employ is significantly higher than that of capital-intensive ones, and therefore the more access
society as a whole will have to the fruits of the capital (Leamer et al. 1999, 13-14). In good
economic times, and good international prices the profit shares of labor-intensive industries will
lead to a higher redistribution of wealth and a shortening of the gap between the rich and the
poor. The factor rewards of employees of such industries will yield higher returns, and therefore
will have more opportunities of investing in their own education. The more educated the society,
the more likely that they will resolve their conflicts through negotiation and the less likely that
social unrest will occur (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 1225). If economies count with a diversified
net export product mix, and among them the labor-intensive industries hold a large share of
exports the resulting benefits for workers could lead to higher school enrollment and a potential
decrease in inequality. Secondary and tertiary investment will increase as the society will offer
better opportunities for investors searching for skilled labor. Therefore:
H2: large shares of natural resources that feed labor-intensive industries will increase the
levels of secondary and tertiary FDI.
A counter argument to these hypotheses is that downward pressure on wages due to a
decrease in the return of factor rewards might attract foreign companies seeking for low labor
costs. Furthermore, Falk (2002) argues that the interests of foreign companies are best served by
governments that severely control their even dissatisfied workers, and that can ensure conditions
10

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/21

10

Romero Mascarell: Latin America's resource curse and FDI.

favorable to their investments (Blanton and Blanton 2007, 143). However, politicians seek
reelection, and considering the political trend of Latin American leaders in the past ten years they
are less permeable to lobby groups than they are to citizens’ pressure. Broad access to elected
officials and the democratic participation of dissatisfied citizens might offer institutionalized
venues through which workers can seek protection from the state, like less flexible labor policies
and longer contracts (Li and Resnick 2003, 177).
Methodology and Analysis
Model
This paper analyzes levels of natural resources, inequality, and FDI from fifteen Latin
American1 countries from years 1984 to 2007. The statistical model2 takes the shape of a twostage least square regression (2SLS) using a first model –Stage A- predicting inequality from
natural resource abundance and a second model –Stage B- predicting investment from inequality.
The first model, put forth by Leamer (1999), attempts to explain income inequality through the
presence of natural resources, by regressing GINI values on net exports disaggregated by type petroleum, agricultural, forest, labor and capital-intensive products, machinery, and chemicals.
The second model, put forth by Alesina and Perotti (1996) attempts to explain levels of
investment from levels of income inequality, by regressing levels of exports (as a percentage
share of GDP), on GINI values. The 2SLS model set forth in this paper attempts to evaluate
inequality as the path coefficient between natural resource abundance and FDI. My adaptation of
the first model tries to predict levels of inequality (measured with GINI coefficients from the
1

The fifteen Latin American countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Other countries
from the region were excluded due to data availability on FDI.
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WDI) from natural resource abundance (measured by industry exports as a share of GDP in
constant U$ 2000). The control variables are replicated from the Leamer model as worker’s
share of crops and forest land (measured from WDI as the share of Arable land and Forest land
in hectares per Economically active population in agriculture), and education (measured
primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment).
My replication of the second stage uses the predicted GINI values obtained in the first
stage to calculate on the one hand, the levels of primary FDI, and on the other the levels of
secondary and tertiary FDI, aggregated. The control variables for the second stage attempt to
resemble that of the Alesina and Perotti model: percentage of urban population and political
instability (using two indicators from the International Country Risk Guide: internal conflict, and
law and order). The 2SLS model looks as following:
Stage A: 1.a) INEQUALITY= B0 + B1 (LABOR-intensive) + B2 (CAPITAL-intensive) +
B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 (Forest land/Agricultural
worker) + B5 (Primary school enrollment) + B6 (Secondary school
enrollment) + B7 (Tertiary school enrollment)

Natural
Resources and
Primary FDI

Stage B: 1.b) PRIMARY FDI= B0 + B1 (INEQUALITY from Stage A) + B2 (% Urban
population) + B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 (Forest
land/Agricultural worker) + B5 (Internal conflict) + B6 (Law and order)

Stage A: 2.a) INEQUALITY= B0 + B1 (LABOR-intensive) + B2 (CAPITAL-intensive) +
Natural
Resources and
Secondary and
Tertiary FDI

B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 (Forest land/Agricultural
worker) + B5 (Primary school enrollment) + B6 (Secondary school
enrollment) + B7 (Tertiary school enrollment)

Stage B: 2.b) SECONDARY and TERTIARY FDI= B0 + B1 (INEQUALITY from Stage A)
+ B2 (% Urban population) + B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4
(Forest land/Agricultural worker) + B5 (Internal conflict) + B6 (Law and
order)

Dependent Variables

12
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The dependent variable of income inequality is measured by the GINI coefficients of the
fifteen Latin American countries taken from the World Development Indicators database. The
dependent variables of primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI are from the United Nations
database. The models by Leamer et al. and Alesina and Perotti that inspired this research utilize
the same variables with the only difference that the latter do not specify whether investment is
domestic or foreign. By differentiating FDI by primary, secondary, and tertiary we are able to
better understand the implications of different types of export product mixes, and their impact on
inequality. Primary FDI refers to investment in petroleum, mining, and agriculture. Secondary
FDI refers to investment in manufacture industries. Tertiary FDI refers to investments in service
industries. All types of FDI are measured as a percentage share of GDP (in constant U$ 2000).
Independent variables
Natural endowment indicators
In order to replicate as much as possible the Leamer et al. model I recreated their
measures of exports, by replacing them with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). I revised the indicators provided by the WDI and
noticed that the category of Food and Agricultural Raw materials exports was not applicable for
testing the model that Laemer presents. In such categories, crops of all types are aggregated
under a single variable: Food. I dismissed them since none of them allow us to differentiate
between capital-intensive and labor-intensive exports in the region. Considering that cereals are
more capital-intensive than other crops, like fruits and vegetables that employ more labor, I
decided to break up the category of Food and measure raw material exports individually from
FAO data on each of these commodities.

13
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In order to resemble the Leamer et al. model I also recreated their measures of petroleum
products, by replacing it with Fuel exports from the WDI. The Leamer et al.’s variable MAT
(fertilizers, coal, natural gas, and metals) has been replaced by the WDI indicator Ore exports
excluding natural gas due to data availability. The variable TRP-PERM (tropical permanent:
fruit, sugar, and coffee) was replaced by FAO data on each of these commodities, adding
vegetables to the list of this category, because FAO aggregates vegetables and fruits together.
The variable TRP-ANNUAL (tropical annual: vegetables and grains) is composed by FAO values
on exports of the three major types of grain in the region: maize, rice, and soybeans. The variable
ANL (Animal products: live animals, meat dairy, eggs, fish, hides, and fats) has been gathered
from FAO on all those commodities except live animals, because Latin America exports mostly
meat rather than animals. The variable CER (Cereals and grains: cereals, feeding stuff, tobacco,
oil seeds, and fibers) have all been individually collected using FAO data, as well as for the
variables FOR-PERM (forest permanent: wood, lumber) and for FOR-MANUF (Forest
manufactures: pulp and paper). The variable LAB (labor-intensive manufactures: furniture,
clothing, footwear, coins) has been replaced by the indicator Manufactures exports from WDI.
The variable CAP (capital-intensive manufactures: leather, rubber, textiles, iron, steel, fixtures) is
probably the weakest of all the variables, since only rubber and textiles were available from FAO
data. The variables MCH (machinery) and CHM (Chemicals) are part of the Manufactures
exports indicator from the WDI. These variables from above have been grouped into two major
variables: CAPITAL-intensive exports, and LABOR-intensive exports. CAPITAL aggregates
FOR-MANUF, Ores exports, Manufacture exports, CAP, and Fuels. LABOR aggregates: TRPPERM, TRP-ANNUAL, ANL, and FOR-MANUF.
Political instability indicators
14
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The political instability index proposed by Alesina and Perotti poses a conceptual
obstacle. Their index consists of five variables: ASSASS and DEATH, which capture phenomena
of mass violence and illegal forms of political expression; SCOUP and UCOUP, which capture
illegal and typically violent transfers of executive power, successful or unsuccessful; and DEM a
dummy variable to control for the higher likelihood of violence in dictatorship. However,
political instability is reflected not only in the outcomes (attempts of coup d’état, assassinations)
but rather in the process of deterioration of government: government unity, legislative strength,
popular support, unemployment, consumer confidence, contract viability/expropriation. Violence
and attempts of coups do not capture the process of deterioration, which might become the red
flags perceived by foreign companies, who by the time there has been a coup d’état they may
have already withdrew their investments from the host country. The decision making process of
a company deciding on whether to invest or not in a country involves analyzing a more general
picture of political stability. Even though investors consider violence an important factor in the
decision to invest, they would most likely not consider exact numbers of assassinations, but
rather will try to get information on the general perception about the political environment of the
host country.
Other options for measures of political instability are indicators from International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the State Failure Index from
Foreign Policy, and Nations in Transit, from Freedom House. The data sources of this index are
extracted from expert assessments rating multiple countries. This index resembles that of Nations
in Transit (Freedom House), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Global Insight, World Bank
CPIA. All these expert assessments have been widely used for comparisons across countries and
over time. Their methods differ in several potentially important ways. The ratings for the ICRG
15
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are formed by a network of correspondents with country-specific expertise, but are determined
centrally by a very small number of people. Some scholars have disregarded the ICRG index for
the lack of disclosure in their assessment criteria and its methodology (including sources of
information) and for not facilitating extensive country narratives containing qualitative
assessments to accompany the quantitative ratings (Knack, 2007). However, this index was
adopted for this model because it not only focuses on political violence but also on the factors
determining government stability that private investors care the most. Sources producing these
types of indicators have different constituencies or audiences, with potential implications for
what their ratings are measuring. The ICRG is marketed by profit-making companies and multinational investors and other paying subscribers (Knack, 2007). Most subscribers to the ICRG are
more interested in conditions facing foreign investors than in those facing local investors. The
ICRG ratings can be expected to focus on those most pertinent obstacles facing foreign investors,
who are their paying subscribers. For each of the five indicators of political instability the ICRG
provides a single measure intended to reflect a mix of various other aspects. As a result, the
indicators of political instability I decide to use for this research are taken from the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
The first of these indicators, called internal conflict, is an assessment of political violence
in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to
those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The
lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war. The risk rating assigned is
the sum of three subcomponents (civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, and civil
disorder), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score
16
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of 4 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. Finally, the
indicators law and order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to
three points. The law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the
legal system, while the order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1
– if it suffers from a very high crime rate of if the law is routinely ignored without effective
sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes).
Results:
The first stage of the multivariate regression does not entirely resonate with previous
literature on the relationship between natural endowments and inequality. The model of natural
resources is able to explain almost 40 percent of the variance in the levels of GINI coefficients.
My results in Table 1 show a strong positive correlation between inequality and levels of laborintensive exports with significance of 1%. This strong relationship is the opposite that I expected.
Countries that possess large shares of labor-intensive industries are associated with high levels of
GINI coefficients, because the returns to labor might not increase with the rise of the relative
prices of these industries. Setbacks to my hypothesis might become a plausible argument since
an increase in return to factor rewards might be occurring as a result of regulatory labor policies
or redistributive politics by the host country, such as government spending in social programs,
subsidies etc. A strong positive relationship with a 1% statistical significance exists between
levels of GINI and secondary school enrollment. This is also the opposite of what I expected.
Surprisingly, results show that capital-intensive exports have a negative relationship with
GINI coefficients with 10% of statistical significance. This group of industries tends to have a
higher concentration of capital in the hands of a small percentage of the population. Leamer et al.
17
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show how these industries employ smaller numbers of workers, and I deduce that the negative
relationship could be the result of the grouping of different variables with different product mix
into a single variable. However, when the industries that compose the capital-intensive group are
disaggregated by specific industry the relationship appears to be stronger among exports from
industries such as mining and cereal. In comparison to the rest of the product mix of Latin
American countries, the share of labor factors in these industries is significantly smaller than
capital factors, relative to other commodities. Furthermore, tertiary education shows a sound
negative relationship with GINI coefficients, which might not necessary be a causal connection,
but the symptom of an already unequal society with a larger presence of skilled workers. If more
people enroll in tertiary education, more people in the middle class have access to opportunities
for higher wages. This result could be interpreted in two ways: or also that poor people accessing
to tertiary education through publicly subsidized education, a factor not included in this model;
or also that more middle income people are attaining education and distancing themselves from
poor people in the job market.

Table 1
STAGE 1 Variables Grouped: GINI and correlations with Natural Resource Exports
grouped into labor- and capital-intensive; Education, and Land Per Worker
Variables
Labor-intensive exports/GDP
Capital-intensive exports /GDP
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)

Estimate coefficient

Standard error

27.152***

(7.965)

-12.726*

(6.912)

0.013

(0.061)

0.237***

(0.048)
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School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)

-0.317***

(0.060)

Cropland/Agricultural worker

-11.996

(12.084)

Forestland/Agricultural worker

-5.994*

(3.576)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When I ungroup the variables composing the labor- and capital-intensive categories in
Table 2, the results of some variables weakly confirm the hypothesis. First, the capital exports
variable from the Leamer model –note that this is not the Capital-intensive variable grouping
other capital-intensive industries- shows a sound positive relation with GINI coefficients. The
results resonate with my hypothesis and with theories based on the Stopel-Samuelson model. As
predicted, the results of tropical crops, fuels, and animal products show that their levels have a
positive relation with GINI levels, having a negative impact on equality.
However, mining and cereals are negatively related to the levels of GINI. Both industries
share the same characteristics of low levels of people employed, and a dependence on natural
resources. Surprisingly, abundance of these endowments is correlated with high levels of
equality, the opposite of what I expected and what Spilimbergo et al. (1999) had concluded.
Government distortionary taxation might be interfering with the logical and expected impact of
these industries on inequality. Cropland and forestland per agricultural worker shows a negative
relation with GINI coefficients, which could be interpreted as capital-intensive agricultural
19
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industries, contradicting my hypothesis. Tertiary school enrollment also shows a strong negative
relationship with the levels of inequality. The results do not echo my hypothesis and a reason for
this might be due to other factors not included in the model, such as type of tertiary enrollment,
especially those involved in public education. Ungrouping the categories of labor- and capitalintensive does not allow us to conclude that countries with predominant capital-intensive exports
in their product mix show higher levels of income inequality neither can we conclude the
opposite about labor-intensive ones.
Table 2
STAGE 1 Variables Ungrouped: GINI and correlations with Natural Resource Exports
ungrouped from labor- and capital- intensive type; Education, and Land Per Worker.1
Variables

Estimate

Standard Error

School enrollment, secondary (% gross)

0.283***

(0.053)

Ores exports/GDP

-48.114***

(12.545)

CAP exports/GDP

264.959***

(82.140)

Cropland/Agricultural Worker

-37.991**

(14.602)

Fuel exports/GDP

23.302**

(9.582)

TRP-ANNUAL exports/GDP

287.696**

(120.786)

CER exports/GDP

-200.603**

(94.494)

School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)

-0.153**

(0.074)

Forestland/Agricultural Worker

-8.495**

(4.228)

ANL exports/GDP

180.753*

(97.361)

TOTAL exports

0.000

(0.000)

FOR-MANUF exports/GDP

166.109

(196.084)

TRP-PERM exports/GDP

18.122

(23.008)

Manufacture exports/GDP

-6.413

(11.181)
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FOR-PERM exports/GDP

-361.776

School enrollment, primary (% gross)

0.019

Observations

360

R2

.4

(1122.136)
0.065

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 (exports as share of GDP in constant U$2000; education as primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment; Land per worker, as Crops
and Forest land per Agricultural worker)

The predicted values of inequality generated by the regression line were used for the
second stage of the research estimating primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI as a result of
inequality (values from stage 1), percentage of urban population, and indicators of political
instability are shown in Table 3. The results show that the relation between GINI coefficients
and levels of primary FDI has no statistical significance. Notice that there is a strong positive
relationship with secondary and tertiary FDI with less than 1% statistical significance. This,
partially resonates with the results presented by Walsh and Yu (2010), who claim that primary
investments that have little contact with the broader economy would not be expected to be
affected by the development of the financial system or the degree of school enrollment in the
population (Walsh and Yu, 2010, 13). However, the results do not echo the hypothesis in that
levels of secondary and tertiary FDI increase in societies with labor-intensive industries that have
more unequal societies. A possible explanation for this might be that secondary and tertiary FDI
are not able to find the human capital and skilled labor required for manufacture- and serviceoriented investments, as well as other factors outside of the scope of this paper.
As Alesina and Perotti (1996) demonstrated, my results show that political stability is
generally associated with higher levels of primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI. Investors might
follow other investors that have previously settled in a host country. In this way, knowledge
about what countries are good for investment is signaled in the market place, and sometimes
21
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shared from investor to investor because both might benefit greatly by the presence of the other
due to potential partnership and cooperation. Even though increasing the inflow of FDI also
raises competition in the host country, the business community might make the environment
exponentially better for foreign businesses and may allow for the replication of good business
practices and experience from those who have been in the host country for longer. Another
conclusion is that inequality and political instability explain only 13 percent of the variance of
primary FDI whereas inequality coupled with the same control variables explains 40 percent of
the variance of secondary and tertiary FDI.
Table 3
STAGE 2: FDI, Inequality as a path coefficient, and Political Instability.
Variables
GINI

Urban population (% of total)

Internal Conflict

Law and Order

Observations
R2

Total FDI

Primary FDI

0.000***

0.000

Secondary and
Tertiary FDI
0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000*

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.000

(0.001)

(0.000)

0.001

-0.001

-0.001***

0.000

(0.001)

(0.000)

0.000

0.005***

0.003***

0.002*

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.001

360

360

360

0.13

0.4

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusion
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Even though this research does not find strong evidence to prove that inequality is the
appropriate coefficient path to explain levels of FDI from natural resource abundance, it does
explain more the variance in secondary and tertiary FDI than it does in primary FDI. The
inequality levels generated by the levels of capital and labor-intensive exports of the first stage of
the model have a positive relationship with the levels of secondary and tertiary FDI, and no
relation with the levels of primary FDI. Whereas the model predicting levels of primary FDI
from levels of inequality explain 13 percent of the variance, the model predicting levels of
secondary and tertiary FDI explain 40 percent. Even though, the results do not fit the hypotheses,
they somewhat resonate with that of Leamer et al. Crops that require more labor such as the
production of fruits and vegetables, have a positive effect on equality in the region. Finally, my
results do not confirm the findings of Leamer and Alesina and Perotti, but further research is
needed for the evaluation of inequality as the path coefficient explaining FDI from natural
resource abundance.
Further research
The weakness of the model is the result of many factors that could be addressed in further
research. First, omitted variable bias, caused by the exclusion of typical macroeconomic control
variables for FDI such as openness, GDP growth, average inflation, real effective exchange rate,
etc. could impact the results significantly. Even though data on these macroeconomic variables
was collected it was not included in this model in order to replicate the work of Leamer and
Alesina and Perotti, who only used the control variables specified in the 2SLS model.3 Also, data

Alesina and Perotti, who studied 71 countries also included other control variables for middle
class, ratio of real domestic investment, percentage of the population belong to the main
ethnic linguistic group, among those referred in this paper.
3
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on FDI broken into primary, secondary, and tertiary was very incomplete and only the fifteen
countries chosen had relative complete values. Also, adding more control variables would result
in losing too many degrees of freedom for my small dataset. Second, issues of endogeneity might
be impacting the high correlation between inequality and labor-intensive exports. It is uncertain
from my model whether labor-intensive exports proliferate in more equal societies as society
demands government to attract jobs, or whether equality is the result of labor-intensive industries
that enjoy higher returns to factor rewards. The same applies for the negative relation between
capital-intensive exports and inequality. Third, this paper does not include a correction of the
variance-covariance usually performed in 2SLS models, by applying the correct mean squared
error. Further research should address the temporal dependence of my data and the fact that
errors cluster by country. Finally, natural resources such as land might have different effects on
inequality, as crops that require more machinery and less labor experience high returns to capital
might experience different export taxes. Unless the government engages in distortionary taxing
from exports of those industries, then levels of equality might remain low. If this is the case, then
future models should consider government spending in social programs and poverty alleviation
as a percentage of GDP to capture the effect of government in redressing inequality.
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STAGE 1
Response GINI ESTIMATED FROM FIT LINE
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.389816
0.359523
5.279111
53.46007
149

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
7
141
148

Sum of Squares
2510.3810
3929.5311
6439.9122

Mean Square
358.626
27.869

F Ratio
12.8683
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Labor intensive/GDP
Capital intensive/GDP
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
Cropland/AgriculWorker
Forestland/AgricWorker

Estimate
45.153234
27.151769
-12.72634
0.0133385
0.2371181
-0.316805
-11.99572
-5.993621

Std Error
5.712713
7.964554
6.911893
0.061063
0.048346
0.060309
12.0835
3.576167

t Ratio
7.90
3.41
-1.84
0.22
4.90
-5.25
-0.99
-1.68

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0009*
0.0677
0.8274
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.3225
0.0960
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Residual by Predicted Plot

Labor intensive/GDP
Leverage Plot

Capital intensive/GDP
Leverage Plot
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School enrollment, primary (% gross)
Leverage Plot

School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
Leverage Plot

School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
Leverage Plot
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Cropland/AgriculWorker
Leverage Plot

Forestland/AgricWorker
Leverage Plot

Response GINI ESTIMATED FROM FIT LINE
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
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RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.532284
0.475592
4.776876
53.46007
149

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
16
132
148

Sum of Squares
3427.8649
3012.0472
6439.9122

Mean Square
214.242
22.819

F Ratio
9.3889
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
TOTAL EXPORT
TRP-PERMExp/GDP
TRP-ANNUALExp/GDP
ANLExp/GDP
CERExp/GDP
CAPExp/GDP
FOR-MANUFExp/GDP
FOR-PERMExp/GDP
FuelTotalExp/GDP
OresTotalExp/GDP
ManufTotExp/GDP
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
Cropland/AgriculWorker
Forestland/AgricWorker

Estimate
38.85227
-1.2e-11
18.122137
287.69563
180.75337
-200.6028
264.95914
166.10939
-361.7763
23.301694
-48.11397
-6.412795
0.0194541
0.2833097
-0.153082
-37.99078
-8.494896

Std Error
6.022671
1.34e-11
23.00849
120.7857
97.36118
94.49447
82.13953
196.0835
1122.136
9.582488
12.54458
11.18058
0.064645
0.053413
0.073664
14.60209
4.227537

Estimate

Std Error

0.2833097
-48.11397
264.95914
-37.99078
23.301694
287.69563
-200.6028
-0.153082
-8.494896
180.75337
-1.2e-11
166.10939
18.122137
-6.412795
-361.7763
0.0194541

0.053413
12.54458
82.13953
14.60209
9.582488
120.7857
94.49447
0.073664
4.227537
97.36118
1.34e-11
196.0835
23.00849
11.18058
1122.136
0.064645

t Ratio
6.45
-0.90
0.79
2.38
1.86
-2.12
3.23
0.85
-0.32
2.43
-3.84
-0.57
0.30
5.30
-2.08
-2.60
-2.01

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.3689
0.4323
0.0187*
0.0656
0.0356*
0.0016*
0.3985
0.7477
0.0164*
0.0002*
0.5672
0.7639
<.0001*
0.0396*
0.0103*
0.0465*

Sorted Parameter Estimates
Term
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
OresTotalExp/GDP
CAPExp/GDP
Cropland/AgriculWorker
FuelTotalExp/GDP
TRP-ANNUALExp/GDP
CERExp/GDP
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
Forestland/AgricWorker
ANLExp/GDP
TOTAL EXPORT
FOR-MANUFExp/GDP
TRP-PERMExp/GDP
ManufTotExp/GDP
FOR-PERMExp/GDP
School enrollment, primary (% gross)

t
Ratio
5.30
-3.84
3.23
-2.60
2.43
2.38
-2.12
-2.08
-2.01
1.86
-0.90
0.85
0.79
-0.57
-0.32
0.30

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0002*
0.0016*
0.0103*
0.0164*
0.0187*
0.0356*
0.0396*
0.0465*
0.0656
0.3689
0.3985
0.4323
0.5672
0.7477
0.7639
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Prediction Profiler

STAGE 2
Response PRIMARY/GDP
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.134758
0.117551
0.010698
0.005917
360

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
7
352
359

Sum of Squares
0.00627394
0.04028334
0.04655728

Mean Square
0.000896
0.000114

F Ratio
7.8318
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Urban population (% of total)
InternalConflict
LawOrder

Estimate
-0.00438
1.0368e-5
-8.277e-6
-0.001082
0.0029343

Std Error
0.004732
7.523e-5
4.245e-5
0.000317
0.00069

t Ratio
-0.93
0.14
-0.19
-3.41
4.25

Prob>|t|
0.3552
0.8905
0.8455
0.0007*
<.0001*
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Residual by Predicted Plot

GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Leverage Plot

Urban population (% of total)
Leverage Plot
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InternalConflict
Leverage Plot

LawOrder
Leverage Plot

Response SEC TER/GDP
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare

0.409001
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RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.397248
0.014866
0.015764
360

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
7
352
359

Sum of Squares
0.05383886
0.07779618
0.13163504

Mean Square
0.007691
0.000221

F Ratio
34.8002
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Urban population (% of total)
InternalConflict
LawOrder

Estimate
-0.029089
0.0003515
-0.000101
0.0003228
0.0017398

Std Error
0.006575
0.000105
0.000059
0.00044
0.000959

t Ratio
-4.42
3.36
-1.71
0.73
1.82

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0009*
0.0889
0.4641
0.0704

Effect Tests
Source
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Urban population (% of total)
InternalConflict
LawOrder

Nparm DF
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1

Sum of Squares
0.00249857
0.00064331
0.00011874
0.00072808

F Ratio Prob > F
11.3051
0.0009*
2.9108
0.0889
0.5372
0.4641
3.2943
0.0704

Residual by Predicted Plot
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GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Leverage Plot

Urban population (% of total)
Leverage Plot

InternalConflict
Leverage Plot
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LawOrder
Leverage Plot

Response TOTAL FDI/GDP
Whole Model
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.39439
0.382346
0.019459
0.021681
360

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
7
352
359

Sum of Squares
0.08680081
0.13328820
0.22008901

Mean Square
0.012400
0.000379

F Ratio
32.7474
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Urban population (% of total)

Estimate
-0.033469
0.0003619
-0.000109

Std Error
0.008607
0.000137
7.722e-5

t Ratio
-3.89
2.64
-1.41

Prob>|t|
0.0001*
0.0085*
0.1592
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Term
InternalConflict
LawOrder

Estimate
-0.000759
0.0046741

Std Error
0.000577
0.001255

t Ratio
-1.32
3.73

Prob>|t|
0.1889
0.0002*

Residual by Predicted Plot

GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables
Leverage Plot

Urban population (% of total)
Leverage Plot
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InternalConflict
Leverage Plot

LawOrder
Leverage Plot

Response GINI ESTIMATED FROM FIT LINE
Actual by Predicted Plot
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Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.389816
0.359523
5.279111
53.46007
149

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C. Total

DF
7
141
148

Sum of Squares
2510.3810
3929.5311
6439.9122

Mean Square
358.626
27.869

F Ratio
12.8683
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Labor intensive/GDP
Capital intensive/GDP
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
Cropland/AgriculWorker
Forestland/AgricWorker

Estimate
45.153234
27.151769
-12.72634
0.0133385
0.2371181
-0.316805
-11.99572
-5.993621

Std Error
5.712713
7.964554
6.911893
0.061063
0.048346
0.060309
12.0835
3.576167

t Ratio
7.90
3.41
-1.84
0.22
4.90
-5.25
-0.99
-1.68

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0009*
0.0677
0.8274
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.3225
0.0960

Sorted Parameter Estimates
Term
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
Labor intensive/GDP
Capital intensive/GDP
Forestland/AgricWorker
Cropland/AgriculWorker
School enrollment, primary (% gross)

Estimate
-0.316805
0.237118
1
27.15176
9
-12.72634
-5.993621
-11.99572
0.013338
5

Std Error
0.060309
0.048346

t Ratio t Ratio
-5.25
4.90

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*

7.964554

3.41

0.0009*

6.911893
3.576167
12.0835
0.061063

-1.84
-1.68
-0.99
0.22

0.0677
0.0960
0.3225
0.8274

Prediction Profiler
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